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ABSTRACT 
Digitalization challenges existing organizations and industries. The associated advancement 
changes the way organizations and their customers interact. This has increasingly fostered the 
emergence of platforms to facilitate such interaction. Online platforms are software or 
hardware infrastructures that serve as a foundation and facilitate the interaction between 
multiple parties (e.g., between organizations and users). Organizations create platforms as part 
of a larger ecosystem. One major challenge concerns the design of platform-based ecosystems 
so all participants benefit from their participation. The management of associated 
relationships with other ecosystem participants is consequently a key challenge and demands 
according foresight. 
Platform-based ecosystems are subject to research in the field of information systems. Thus, 
scientific literature addresses many corresponding research questions and provides valuable 
insights for both research and practice. However, organizations face numerous challenges 
when engaging in ecosystems. Such challenges are, e.g., to develop new ecosystems, to 
incentivize participants to participate in the ecosystem, to cooperate with other participants, 
and to monitor the ecosystem. In this respect, this doctoral thesis provides a brief overview of 
platform-based ecosystems and the respective participants therein. Further, the thesis 
addresses four key challenges in the context of platform-based ecosystems, and proposes novel 
approaches in order to overcome the challenges.  
The basis for the novel approaches stems from five research papers. The first and second 
research paper address the challenge of determining design options when developing new 
ecosystems via blockchain-enabled initial coin offerings. The papers feature a taxonomy and 
derive predominant archetypes by drawing on real-world cases. The third research paper 
addresses the challenge of incentivizing users to participate in platform-based ecosystems. The 
paper proposes an approach to model financial incentives concerning platform adoption. The 
fourth research paper proposes an approach to analyze organizational cooperation patterns for 
the purpose of innovation integration. The developed approach incorporates taxonomy 
development and enables organizations to determine cooperation characteristics to align the 
cooperation decision with the cooperation objectives. The fifth research paper addresses the 
challenge of monitoring customer sentiment on online platforms. The proposed design science 
research artefact includes a detector of negative sentiment such that organizations are able to 
identify when a negative sentiment develops, and intervene before users spread the sentiment, 
e.g., through comments.  
Each research paper answers a stand-alone research question in the realm of platform-based 
ecosystems and derives a theoretically founded and separately evaluated research artefact. The 
artefacts draw on underlying, well-established research methods that allow answering the 
respective problem statements. Since the problem statements are motived in a practical 
context, this thesis bridges the gap between a practically oriented problem and a theoretically 
founded solution. As a result, the derived insights contain a contribution for both, research in 
the field of Information Systems and practice audience, and encourage the engagement of both 
domains.   
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 MOTIVATION 
Digitalization fundamentally changes society as we know it and requires innovation in close to 
all industries (Gimpel et al. 2018; Karimi and Walter 2015; Legner et al. 2017; Veit et al. 2014). 
It covers sociotechnical challenges and how to adopt them in the individual, organizational, 
and societal context (Legner et al. 2017). Digitalization enables dynamic capabilities, novel 
forms of (digital) relationships, and tangles products or services with the underlying IT 
infrastructure. These characteristics are the underlying fuel for today’s interaction between 
organizations and users, which increasingly move to various kinds of platform types. 
Unsurprisingly, such platforms are the centerpiece of many of today’s digital giants like 
Amazon, Google, Facebook, or Apple (Gawer 2014), and became ubiquitous in the modern 
world (Parker et al. 2016; Tiwana 2014).  
Platforms are usually part of larger ecosystems where organizations bring together various 
applications, add-on software, and hardware components (Baldwin 2000; Sanchez and 
Mahoney 1996). These platforms distinguish a special form of ecosystems, called platform-
based ecosystems, where the centerpiece of the ecosystem is an online platform. The platform 
in this context can be a software platform (Firefox, Apple’s operation system iOS), a social 
media platform (Facebook), a web service (Amazon, Google), or a marketplace (“eBay”) 
(Tiwana et al. 2010). Organizations maintain platform-based ecosystems as an online presence 
through which they can interact with (potential) customers, and, therefore, form an online 
presence. Within these platform-based ecosystems, organizations work together as partners, 
or compete for customers (Hannah and Eisenhardt 2018).  
In the business context, the term “ecosystem” was initially introduced by James Moore as an 
ecosystem that is made up of customers, agents, channels, and suppliers (Moore 1993; 2016). 
Whenever organizations develop such ecosystems, they ideally can form and shape it according 
to their needs and wishes. This doctoral thesis follows the definition of Adner (2017) and 
defines ecosystems as “the alignment structure of the multilateral set of partners that need to 
interact in order for a focal value proposition to materialize” (Adner 2017, p. 40).  
Platform-based ecosystems consist of various components, such as platforms, modules, 
interfaces, and the overall architecture (Cusumano and Gawer 2002; Tiwana et al. 2010). 
Figure 1 visualizes these ecosystem components.  
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 Visualization of ecosystem components (own representation based on 
Tiwana et al. 2010) 
 
Platform refers to the extensible codebase of the ecosystem that provides core functionality 
shared by the modules that interoperate with it and the interfaces through which the modules 
interoperate (Baldwin and Woodard 2009; Eisenmann et al. 2006; Tiwana et al. 2010). Such 
platforms serve as places where at least two participants come together for interaction (e.g., 
organizations and users on a marketplace). Around these platforms, organizations build 
modules which are add-on software subsystems connected to the platform to provide 
additional functionality (Baldwin 2000; Sanchez and Mahoney 1996). The interfaces are 
specifications and design rules that provide a description of the interaction and information 
exchange between the platform and the modules (Katz and Shapiro 1994; Tiwana et al. 2010). 
The architecture provides the design rules for the ecosystem and describes how the relatively 
stable platform and the complementary modules partition the ecosystem (Baldwin and 
Woodard 2009; Katz and Shapiro 1994; Sanchez and Mahoney 1996; Tiwana et al. 2010; Ulrich 
1995).  
In a platform-based ecosystem, numerous organizations and customers interact with each 
other. Between organizations, cooperation and competition is possible. Organizations 
cooperate in cases in which one organization provides an additional module to a platform of 
another organization. In contrary, organizations compete when at least two organizations 
propose the same functionality and, therefore, compete for users in the ecosystem. Thus, 
ecosystems, platforms, and modules can create cooperation opportunities, but can also serve 
as entry-barriers for competitors or their ecosystems (Tiwana et al. 2010). Examples for 
platform-based ecosystems are the smartphone operating systems of Apple and Google: Every 
user who buys a smart phone with an Apple or Google operating system automatically joins 
one of the two ecosystems. The central platform of the ecosystem is the respective software 
store1, the AppStore (Apple) or the PlayStore (Google). Both companies build various modules 
around their platform, such as mailing-applications, word-processing applications, or cloud 
storage. Other organizations that aim on offering additional modules to the ecosystems’ users 
need to access the ecosystem via the AppStore or the PlayStore. Consequently, they 
permanently rely on the permission of Apple or Google to provide their product or service. In 
the following, this doctoral thesis refers to a “platform-based ecosystem” as “ecosystem”. 
                                                        
 
1 Please note that both organizations Apple and Google have also built other platforms within 
their ecosystem, e.g., Apple’s application “Health”, Google’s online browser “Chrome”. 
Ecosystem
Module Module
Platform
Interface
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Ecosystems come along with unique characteristics: First, ecosystems are organized around a 
certain product or service (Hannah and Eisenhardt 2018). This results in the complementarity 
of components in the ecosystems, such that they depend on each other. Therefore, complex 
interdependencies among participants exist. Second, ecosystems have bottlenecks (Hannah 
and Eisenhardt 2018). These bottlenecks restrict the growth and/or performance of an 
ecosystem (e.g., poor quality, weak performance, scarcity), and restrains the overall ecosystem 
from performing at its best (Adner and Kapoor 2010; Baldwin 2015). Third, organizations need 
to find a sensitive balance between cooperation and competition within the ecosystem 
(Hannah and Eisenhardt 2018). 
Ecosystems enable organizations to become dominant actors compared to their partners and 
competitors. However, ecosystems also pose great challenges diverse challenges due to their 
complex structure and inherent dependencies. Consequently, value creation by means of an 
ecosystem confronts organization with a magnitude of complex decisions. These decisions 
include developing new ecosystems, incentivizing participants to participate in the ecosystem, 
cooperating with other participants in the ecosystem, or monitoring the ecosystem, and will 
further be addressed by this doctoral thesis. For organizations, these challenges can imply 
tremendous business success or even failure. Information systems (IS) research deals with 
aspects of these challenges of building ecosystems, managing ecosystems, and creating value 
with competitors, complementors, or customers. For organizations that need to make 
decisions regarding ecosystems, methodological approaches are necessary to support and 
enable the management and decision making process. As a result, the objective of this doctoral 
thesis is to provide insights on the utilization of research-based methodology to support the 
relevant decision. More precisely, the objective is to propose theoretically founded research 
artefacts to answer practically motivated problems in the realm of platform-based ecosystems, 
and thereby advancing knowledge in theory and practice.  
 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS AND EMBEDDING OF THE RESEARCH 
PAPERS 
The following Section summarizes the structure of this doctoral thesis, briefly describes the 
underlying five research papers, and outlines their interconnection. Section 1 introduces the 
motivation and sets the outline for the remaining Sections. Section 2 provides an overview of 
the core concepts for this thesis. Therefore, it summarizes related literature on platform-based 
ecosystems and the relevant participants. The remaining Sections 3-6 address key challenges 
for the management of platform-based ecosystems. Consequently, Sections 3-6 capture the 
core concepts of the underlying research papers. For this purpose, Figure 2 provides a 
visualization on the focus of the papers. Section 7 concludes the key findings of this doctoral 
thesis, addresses limitations, and provides directions for further research. 
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 Visualization of embedded underlying research papers (own 
representation based on Tiwana et al. 2010) 
 
As described above, platform-based ecosystems can be a key success factor for organizations 
in the digital age. When developing such ecosystems, organizations need to consider various 
aspects to receive positive responses by other participants, such as users and potential partners 
in the ecosystem. Section 3 briefly reflects the scarce literature on developing new ecosystems 
and introduces blockchain-based initial coin offerings (ICO) as a novel form for building 
ecosystems. To date, the understanding of ICOs from a practitioner’s and from a researcher’s 
perspective is low. As a result, research paper #1 and #2 propose a structuring approach and 
develop a taxonomy to provide a better understanding of related design parameters. Further, 
the research papers propose a clustering approach, deduct ICO archetypes to obtain 
predominant patterns, and perform a secondary market analysis to acquire an outlook on 
short-, medium-, and long-term development of the ICOs.  
For successful ecosystem development, customer incentives play an important role. Especially 
at the beginning, participants expect value generation from ecosystem participation to be low, 
and lack the incentive to join the platform. Section 4 discusses different aspects of user 
incentives to join an ecosystem. In the context of ICOs, this effect is supposed to be different, 
since tokens can provide a financial benefit. Therefore, research paper #3 proposes a two-step 
approach to analyze the incentive, and to find whether ICOs influence the participation 
incentive.  
When organizations interact in their native ecosystems, in competitors’ ecosystems, or in 
complementors’ ecosystems, they need to decide how to co-create value with these alien 
organizations. This is especially important in ecosystems, where technological change rapidly 
shakes up market, influence, and relationships. Section 5 provides an overview of cooperation 
in ecosystems. In financial service industry ecosystems, a recent case is the entry of agile start-
ups (e.g., Fintechs), where existing incumbents have to deal with new organization. In this 
respect, the challenge for incumbents is to decide on the appropriate response, and to find 
potential pathways for cooperation. Research paper #4 proposes a methodology to analyze this 
cooperation design pattern and develops a taxonomy that enables organizations to dismantle 
bank-fintech cooperation into single design parameters. As a result, organizations are able to 
Ecosystem 1 – Organization A
Ecosystem 2 – Organization B
Reference to paper #
Module Module
Platform
Interface
Module
Platform
Interface
#5 #4
#1 #2 #3
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apply this methodology and determine the cooperation characteristics before making a 
decision.  
In platform-based ecosystems, organizations aim to interact with other participants. For this 
purpose, social media platforms often serve as the ecosystem’s centerpiece for customer-
customer and customer-organization interaction. Section 6 provides an overview of the 
characteristics of such platforms. Within these platforms, the customer experience is 
preferably positive, and facilitates the spread of this positive experience. However, also 
negative experiences toward an organization can spread throughout the platform, and 
consequently bears great risk. As a result, organizations need to be able to quickly identify the 
emergence of such negative sentiment, and react accordingly. Research paper #5 proposes a 
design science research artefact to detect such negative sentiment, ideally even before the 
negative sentiment reaches the tipping point.  
Finally, Section 7 concludes by summarizing the key findings of this doctoral thesis, identifying 
connection points for future research, limitations, and acknowledges previous work. Appendix 
A includes the declaration of co-authorship and individual contribution. Appendix B includes 
an overview and the abstracts of the underlying research papers.  
2. PLATFORM-BASED ECOSYSTEMS AND ONLINE 
PLATFORMS  
This Section provides an overview of the most important concepts of this doctoral thesis. First, 
this Section describes the emergence of platform-based ecosystems. Second, it provides a 
simplistic scheme on the actors in the context of platform-based ecosystems. Third, it discusses 
objectives for participation in platform-based ecosystems.  
 THE EMERGENCE OF PLATFORM-BASED ECOSYSTEMS FROM 
DIGITALIZATION 
Digitalization fundamentally changes everyday life. The term encompasses the “manifold 
sociotechnical phenomena and processes of adopting and using these [digital] technologies in 
broader individual, organizational, and societal contexts“ (Legner et al. 2017, p. 301). At the 
forefront of this development are organizations that effectively manage the utilization of this 
trend: Amazon, Google and Facebook still make the most of their money selling information 
about their customers, claim to have transformed themselves, but never entirely left their 
original business (Cortada 2019). Besides the well-known giants of the digital world, there are 
further organizations that successfully embrace digitalization and transform themselves 
(Haverans 2019): Subway completely plans to remodel their self-service kiosk of the future, 
and works with over 150 technology professionals to improve the company’s mobile app. 
Capital One was the first bank to integrate Amazon’s Alexa into their financial transaction 
system, and its mobile banking app was among the first to support Apple’s TouchID. Wal-Mart 
launched an application to enable their programmers to switch between different cloud 
providers. Domino’s Pizza integrated a variety of ways to place orders, such as Twitter or text. 
These examples give an idea about the impact of digital transformation endeavors that many 
organizations undertake to adapt digital technology, and therefore digitalize.  
Digital transformation is a business-centric perspective on strategies that focuses on the 
transformation of products, processes, and organizational aspects owing to new technologies 
(Matt et al. 2015). It consists of the elements use of technologies, changes in value creation, 
structural changes, and financial aspects (Matt et al. 2015). The central aspects requiring 
digital transformation are digital technologies. In the last couple of years novel information 
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technologies raise with the expectation to revolutionize our societal system as we know it. 
“Artificial Intelligence” is expected to replace human jobs (Leetaru 2016), “Blockchain” is 
supposed to eliminate inefficient intermediaries (Peters and Panayi 2016; Schlatt et al. 2016), 
and the “Internet-of-things” is anticipated to generate interoperability across geographically 
distributed users to create value for customers (McKinsey & Company 2016). Unsurprisingly, 
in the current era of digitalization and transformation, the focus for organizations is on the 
exploitation of such technologies with the aim to enable new functionalities and to open 
promising business opportunities (Tilson et al. 2010). As a result, adapting these technologies 
can become a key differentiator against competitors, and a critical factor for financial 
sustainability (Chandy and Tellis 2000; Fagerberg 2005; Teece 2010).  
In hand with digitalization and digital transformation, the last decade facilitated massive 
“improvements in information, communication, and connectivity technologies, which resulted 
in new functionalities” – a process which also changed the perception of Information 
Technology (IT) (Bharadwaj et al. 2013, p. 472). Thus, the way organizations utilize their IT 
fundamentally changed: IT is no longer a business process that enables organizations to carry 
out work across boundaries (e.g., Banker et al. 2006; Bharadwaj et al. 2013; Ettlie and Pavlou 
2006; Kohli and Grover 2008; Rai et al. 2012; Sambamurthy et al. 2003; Straub and Watson 
2001; Subramaniam and Venkatraman 2001; Tanriverdi and Venkatraman 2005; Wheeler 
2002). Much more, IT enables “different forms of dynamic capabilities suitable for turbulent 
environments” (Bharadwaj et al. 2013, p. 472; Pavlou and El Sawy 2006, 2010), transforms 
the structure of social relationships for both, users and organizations, (e.g., Susarla et al. 2012), 
and increasingly tangles products and services with their underlying IT infrastructure (e.g., El 
Sawy 2003; Orlikowski 2010). These three characteristics facilitate the interaction between 
organizations and users in the digital world, which in many cases results in digital platforms 
of various kinds. Unsurprisingly, such platforms are the centerpiece of many of today’s digital 
giants (Gawer 2014), and became ubiquitous in the modern world (Parker et al. 2016; Tiwana 
2014).  
The evolvement of digital platforms changed a multitude of phenomena in the IT landscape 
(de Reuver et al. 2018). User interaction with organizations changed due to online 
communities of consumers (Spagnoletti et al. 2015). Inter-organizational relationships for the 
development of information systems changed due to the connection of app development and 
platform provision (Eaton et al. 2015; Ghazawneh and Henfridsson 2013; Tiwana et al. 2010). 
The architecture of organizations changed due to the development of modular instead of 
monolithic systems (Tiwana et al. 2010). Digital platforms are defined as the extensible 
codebase of a software- or hardware-based system that provide core functionality (Baldwin 
and Woodard 2009; Eisenmann et al. 2006), and usually serve as places where at least two 
parties interact. However, since platforms are not a new phenomenon (Clark 1985; Katz and 
Shapiro 1994), they differ in terms of various characteristics such as homogenization 
(Kallinikos et al. 2013; Yoo et al. 2010) and standardization (Yoo et al. 2010). Within these 
platform-based ecosystems, organizations work together as partners, or compete for 
customers (Hannah and Eisenhardt 2018). Thus, organizations participate in platform-based 
ecosystems to create value from the participation. The creation of value is either through stand-
alone activities (e.g., selling products, offering services), or through cooperation with other 
ecosystem participants. The cooperative creation of value with other organizations or users in 
the platform-based ecosystem coined the term value co-creation (Constantinides et al. 2018; 
Song et al. 2018).  
Resulting from the emergence of ecosystems, competition increasingly shifted towards them. 
Adner (2017) also distinguishes two perspectives on ecosystems: The ecosystem as affiliation, 
which views “ecosystems as communities of associated actors defined by their network and 
platform affiliations”, and ecosystems as structure, “which sees ecosystems as configurations 
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of activity defined by a value proposition” (Adner 2017, p. 40). This doctoral thesis focuses on 
the view of ecosystems as affiliation. In the following, Sections 2.2 and 2.3 resume describing 
the participants of ecosystems and explaining their objective for participation.  
 PARTICIPANTS IN PLATFORM-BASED ECOSYSTEMS 
Within platform-based ecosystems, different participants interact with each other. Such 
participants can be either organizations (organizational roles) or users (user roles). For this 
purpose, Figure 3 summarizes the participants that this thesis considers.  
 Structural visualization of typical participants in a platform-based 
ecosystem (own representation based on Schultz 2007) 
 
2.2.1. Ecosystem Leader  
Early research on platform-based ecosystems identified organizational “leaders” (Gawer and 
Cusumano 2002) or “keystone firms” (Iansiti and Levien 2004) (e.g., Google, Apple, Facebook, 
cf., Gawer 2014). The leader is the coordinator, and orchestrates other organizations and their 
roles within the ecosystem. Ecosystem leaders manage the ecosystem, and are oftentimes able 
to dictate the ecosystem governance (grant or deny access), e.g., by switching off or changing 
application programming interfaces, by charging fees, or by allowing the utilization of data 
(Tiwana et al. 2010). In many cases such as Facebook, Google, or Apple, the value of being the 
ecosystem leader is the primary access to the data and the resulting opportunities. 
Ecosystem leaders must make complex strategic decisions with regard to the other 
organizations in the ecosystem, which can be partners or competitors (Gawer and Cusumano 
2014). For example, if an ecosystem leader develops novel technological approaches that target 
products or services of other organizations, the extension of the scope may eliminate these 
organizations, and thus, eliminates their participation and innovation capabilities from the 
ecosystem (Gawer and Cusumano 2014). As a consequence, the integration of other 
organizations in the ecosystem fails due to too much competition, and eventually can result in 
the failure of the ecosystem (Ozcan and Santos 2015). In contrast, if ecosystem leaders 
cooperate too much, others overtake their market position, or even absorb others’ value 
proposition (Hannah and Eisenhardt 2018). From the ecosystem leader’s perspective, this 
requires the management’s awareness of the decisions’ interdependencies (Ceccagnoli et al. 
2011).  
Cusumano and Gawer (2002) identify four levers of ecosystem leadership: Scope is the 
determination of the amount of internal innovation and external complementation. Product 
technology is the architecture behind the product or service enabling complementation or 
replication. Determination of relationship is the collaborative or cooperative relationship with 
Participant in a 
platform-based ecosystem
Organizational roles
 Ecosystem leader
 Partner
 Competitor
User roles
 Actual customer
 Potential customer
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external organizations. And internal organization is the internal structure suiting the first 
three aspects and the management of conflicts of interest (Cusumano and Gawer 2002). In 
their study, they propose eight ideas for managing ecosystem leadership: First, protect the core 
technology, but share interface technology. Second, put the industry’s common good before 
short term interest. Third, leave the partners’ scope to them. Fourth, test approaches low-key 
before pushing the agenda on a high-key level. Fifth, support partner organizations protecting 
their intellectual property. Sixth, separate the internal production from the support of external 
partner organizations. Seventh, leverage internal processes. Eighth, communicate carefully 
and thoroughly with internal and external stakeholders.  
2.2.2. Partners 
Partners are organizations participating in the platform-based ecosystem for cooperation. 
They create value by providing products or services that are complementary to other goods and 
services within the ecosystem. On average, partners are able to increase their operational 
performance from participation in an ecosystem (Ceccagnoli et al. 2011). As a result, 
organizations have an incentive to become partners and to participate in an ecosystem. 
However, partners are also dependent on the ability to participate in an ecosystem, which is 
usually managed by an ecosystem leader (Cusumano and Gawer 2002) (cf., Section 2.2.1).  
In many cases, partners identify unique niche value propositions complementing other 
organizations’ products or services. Consequentially, partners rely on the success of the 
organization providing the product or service ("dance with the elephant", Cusumano and 
Gawer 2002, p. 54). Before entering such ecosystems, partners consider how actively the 
ecosystem leader collaborates with other organizations, how open the ecosystem’s design is, 
and how likely the other organizations are to compete (Cusumano and Gawer 2002). As a 
result, partners need to be alert on product plans, novel innovations, and quickly react 
accordingly (Cusumano and Gawer 2002).  
Partners with protected intellectual property rights are able to benefit from greater returns, 
and partners with unprotected intellectual property rights need to be very cautious when 
entering ecosystems (Ceccagnoli et al. 2011). The ecosystem leader indirectly benefits from 
partners’ intellectual property rights, because strong partners nurture the platform-based 
ecosystem by contributing strong innovations (Ceccagnoli et al. 2011). This leads to additional 
customers using the platform-based ecosystem, and in turn encourages more organizations to 
become partners (Ceccagnoli et al. 2011). Hence, from an ecosystem perspective, innovative 
partners are welcome since the ecosystem benefits from their participation, and also more 
likely to participate since they are welcomed by the ecosystem’s organizations (Huang et al. 
2009). 
For partner organizations, the benefits from collaborating can be manifold: Organizations 
share information on specific markets, applications, R&D plans, roadmaps, customize 
products, develop joint products, realize joint marketing, and set joint standards and licenses 
(Kapoor 2014). By joining the platforms, partners avoid these costs, and even indicate 
compatibility with the other products and platforms within the ecosystem (Ceccagnoli et al. 
2011). Partners can work together by integrating their products and services, for example 
through application programming interfaces or by synchronizing product development plans. 
Generally, the raise of platform-based ecosystems facilitates novel forms of inter-
organizational cooperation. In many cases, this results in organizations adjusting each other’s 
products and processes according to their ecosystem.  
2.2.3. Competitors  
In many cases, the differentiation between competitors and partners is not obvious. For 
example Apple, Google, and Microsoft started to integrate their central document processing 
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applications, such as Word, Excel, and PowerPoint. However, these organizations are not 
partners, but live with the mutual integration of single applications into each other’s 
ecosystems. This is because all of the three mentioned organizations have interoperating users 
that do not want to restrict themselves to one single ecosystem.  
Competitors are organizations that target the value proposition and aim to access market 
potential. In many cases, the ecosystem leader tries to exclude competitors from the platform. 
In platform-based ecosystems, strong network effects and high switching costs often secure 
ecosystem leaders and their partners form entry of competitors (Eisenmann et al. 2011; Farrell 
and Saloner 1984; Katz and Shapiro 1985). For this purpose, competitors propose ecosystems 
with superior value proposition, replacing existing ones (Evans and Schmalensee 2002). This 
often leads to winner-takes all battles. A strategy for competitors is platform envelopment, 
which is a strategy that does not rely on Schumpeterian innovation and Eisenmann et al. (2011) 
explore for the first time. In this context, organizations bundle their functionality to an existing 
ecosystem leader to leverage shared user relationships and common components. However, in 
cases where ecosystems are too settled and the existing organizations have aligned themselves 
too much, the platform even benefits from competitors and therefore the proposed value for 
participants increases. Competition in ecosystems especially moves to an ecosystem level, 
where ecosystems compete against each other, and on a complementor level, where 
organizations compete against each other to be the favorite complementor (e.g., for the 
ecosystem leader).  
2.2.4. Users 
Users refer to existing and potential customers of organizations participating in the ecosystem. 
Users in ecosystems vary and differentiate in the frequency, volume, type, and quality of digital 
content they produce and consume (Trusov et al. 2010). In the academic discourse, users are 
categorized as passive or active depending on their activities (Burnett 2000; Preece et al. 
2004). Active users are interested in engaging in the ecosystem by creating and sharing 
information, participating in activities, or helping others (Casaló et al. 2007). Passive users 
only browse online groups, and consume content, without participating in the community or 
activities (Burnett 2000; Preece et al. 2004).  
Interaction between users and organizations within platform-based ecosystems can be 
manifold. In this term, this doctoral thesis does not provide an exhaustive overview of all 
possible interactions. To enable and utilize the cooperation potential between organizations 
and users effectively, incentives for both are necessary. Therefore, certain aspects are 
important: It is important to have incentives in place – in some cases these can be intangible 
incentives (e.g., recognition, opinion leadership), while in other cases economic incentives are 
necessary (Sawhney et al. 2005). The incentives for both organizations and users need to be 
well-designed, which can have a remarkable impact on the outcome of the interaction (Toubia 
2006). It is essential to have rules in place regarding intellectual property rights, so that the 
organization is able to use the results of the interaction (e.g., innovative ideas) (Sawhney et al. 
2005).  
 PARTICIPATION OBJECTIVES IN PLATFORM-BASED ECOSYSTEMS 
Participants in platform-based ecosystems participate to achieve positive network effects 
(Constantinides et al. 2018; Song et al. 2018). Examples include reputation enhancement, 
experimentation, relationship building, value creation, and value co-creation as key-factors. 
Besides the typical organization-centric value creation (e.g., sell products, provide services), 
value co-creation increasingly becomes a motivation for organizations to participate in 
ecosystems (Pera et al. 2016). Value co-creation is defined as a “common benefit that accrues 
to alliance partners through combination, exchange, and co-development of idiosyncratic 
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resources” (Dyer and Singh 1998; Lavie 2006). Value co-creation is based on the resource-
based view of the firm, which combines managerial perspectives with the rationale of 
economics (Das and Teng 2000; Lavie 2006; Wade and Hulland 2004). In the traditional 
perspective, organizations were depicted as independent entities (Barney 1991; Dierickx and 
Cool 1989; Wernerfelt 1984). This perspective has changed in today’s digital world in the 
presence of ecosystems, where value co-creation is the value created from relation-specific 
assets, knowledge-sharing routines, complementary resources, and effective governance 
mechanisms (Lavie 2006). This value can only be extracted from intentionally committed and 
shared or jointly possessed resources (Lavie 2006).  
In ecosystems, value is co-created by complex interactions within a network of various 
participants (Gyrd-Jones and Kornum 2013). The presence and interaction of participants 
influences the character of the ecosystem, and this process differentiates the ecosystem from 
common networks (Wieland et al. 2012). The participants jointly co-create value by 
participating, and benefit from the ecosystem by giving and receiving resources (Greer et al. 
2016; Merz et al. 2009). The interest of value co-creation is the synergy of involved participants 
compared to stand-alone value creation (Gyrd-Jones and Kornum 2013). Within these 
ecosystems, organizations need to balance competition and cooperation – too much 
cooperation decreases value generation, and not enough cooperation compromises the 
formation of the ecosystem (Hannah and Eisenhardt 2018; Ozcan and Santos 2015).  
Further, the experience of users becomes important, where customer-to-customer, customer-
to-community, and customer-to-organization interaction is central (Prahalad and 
Ramaswamy 2004). Customer co-creation is the term when the value creation process shifts 
outside the firm and includes informed, connected, empowered, and active customers, so the 
customer participates in the creation process, is involved in problem definition and solution, 
co-constructs personalized experience, or participates in innovation processes (Prahalad and 
Ramaswamy 2004). 
2.3.1. Objectives of organizational participants 
The access to users is still among the key objectives why organizations participate in 
ecosystems, and the target for organizations’ value proposition. In today’s ecosystems, users 
play a central role in value co-creation (e.g., Anker et al. 2015; Grönroos 2011; Payne et al. 
2008; Vargo and Lusch 2008). Value co-creation with customers originates from a dual 
collaborative interaction between organization and customer (Pera et al. 2016). In platform-
based ecosystems, participation in such ecosystems is generally associated with an increase in 
sales and under some conditions, with increasing business performance (Ceccagnoli et al. 
2011). Thus, organizations have an incentive to become part of and to participate in 
ecosystems.  
Further, from an organizational perspective, value co-creation offers significant potentials to 
improve the innovation capability (Frow et al. 2015), and can enhance the innovation process 
(Nambisan 2002). Cooperative innovation between organizations and users is a form of value 
co-creation. Thus, organizations join ecosystems in order to co-create value, which can also be 
novel innovation, incremental invention, and complementary development.  
Ecosystems utilize the internet to facilitate such user interaction in three ways (Sawhney et al. 
2005; Sawhney and Prandelli 2000): First, it allows organizations to continuously and multi-
directionally interact with users. Second, it allows organizations to utilize knowledge shared 
among users groups. Third, it allows organizations to extend the reach and scope of the user 
interaction through independent third parties (e.g., non-customers, competitors’ customers, 
prospective customers).  
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In the era of digitization, the innovation process and its outcomes have changed (Nambisan et 
al. 2017). The ecosystem’s inherent platforms differ in terms of its layered modular 
architecture, which accelerates the ability for innovation, and thus, creates value (Rai et al. 
2019). To co-create value in and profit from ecosystems, organizations themselves need to 
remain innovative. In the era of digitalization, organizations address every aspect of innovation 
using IT to shape and transform their key business activities (Hess et al. 2016; Matt et al. 2015). 
As a result, organizations need to face the technological changes that lead to opportunities, 
such as greater flexibility, reactivity and product individualization (Rachinger et al. 2018). 
2.3.2. Objectives of users 
From a user’s perspective, the incentive to participate in ecosystems is to benefit from it. In 
many cases, organizations integrate users into their value creation activities, and incentivize 
users to be part of them (e.g., by financial benefits such as discounts). For this purpose, 
organizations and users cooperate to create value. Ecosystems achieve this by making life 
easier for the customer (Miller et al. 2002), solving a customer’s problem (Sawhney et al. 
2006), supporting the customer’s peace of mind (Woodruff 1997), satisfying customer needs 
(Tuli et al. 2007), or simply relieving the customer of some responsibility (e.g., Normann and 
Ramírez 1993).  
Further, users participate in ecosystems to connect with other users, interact in social 
relationships like becoming friends, receiving recognition for achievements, and exchanging 
information (about products and services, as well as personal things). These aspects often take 
place in ecosystems that base on social media platforms like Facebook. 
3. DEVELOPMENT OF PLATFORM-BASED ECOSYSTEMS: 
ICO DESIGN PARAMETERS FOR ECOSYSTEM DEVELOPMENT 
This Section explains the general outline of ecosystem development. Since the blockchain-
technology can play an important role when developing an ecosystem using blockchain-based 
tokens, this Section further explains the key characteristics of blockchain and how initial coin 
offerings (ICO) work. Finally, this Section provides a methodology to structure and cluster the 
plethora of design parameters of ICO-based ecosystem development in advance of a decision. 
 ECOSYSTEM DEVELOPMENT AND THE ROLE OF BLOCKCHAIN 
In Section 2, this doctoral thesis provided an overview of ecosystems and key participants. As 
stated, the ecosystem leader organizes the ecosystem and its governance. This leader has to 
determine the infrastructure of the ecosystem (e.g., the set-up of platforms, availability of 
application programming interfaces, coordination of modules), incentives for other 
organizations and users to participate in the ecosystem, and barriers for competitors. In this 
context, organizations need to define the handling of openness, control, and intellectual 
property rights within the ecosystem (Parker and van Alstyne 2018). These design aspects of 
development directly influence the outline of the ecosystem. Openness is the extent of 
restrictions on participation, development, or use that ecosystems pose on their participants 
(Eisenmann et al. 2009), and the choice of the governance model between participants (Laffan 
2012). Control is the ability of the ecosystem leader to dictate advancements in the ecosystem, 
or even restrict external access via application programming interface by other partners 
(Parker and van Alstyne 2018). Intellectual property rights relate to the content that platform 
participants create in platform participation.  
Ecosystems benefit from innovation (cf., Section 2.2 and 2.3), and the respective innovation 
originators have an interest to remain the intellectual property owners. However, ecosystems 
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also benefit from sharing intellectual property, e.g., so other ecosystem participants can build 
on and enhance newly developed intellectual property (e.g., applications, modules, platforms) 
(Boudreau 2010; Parker and van Alstyne 2018). As a result, the development of an ecosystem 
demands various design decisions. Opening an ecosystem to other organizations (i.e., 
competitors) poses the trade-off of between adoption and appropriability, which is the tradeoff 
between encouraging wider adoption (of the own technology) through transparency versus 
sharing profits due to reduced entry barriers (Parker and van Alstyne 2018; West 2003).  
A novel approach to develop ecosystems in a particularly open design is the application of ICO, 
which is a phenomenon based on the blockchain-technology. ICOs promise to be a tool for 
developing ecosystems in a way that organizations and users participate in the development 
process from the beginning, and are able to shape the design of the ecosystem. In the following, 
this Section briefly introduces the basis concept of blockchain, and resumes with explaining 
the phenomenon of ICOs.  
In the past years, the blockchain-technology attracted attention in close to all business sectors. 
Blockchain is supposed to enable novel ecosystems and platforms in a way that entire business 
models arise, and other business models vanish. Even experts do not agree upon the manifold 
effects that the technology promises (Hans et al. 2017; Manski 2017; Miscione et al. 2018). 
However, blockchain also enables decentral and trustful value co-creation between 
organizations, organizations and users, and even between users. Blockchain is one of the most 
rapidly emerging digital technologies of the past years (Lemieux 2016). The technology is a 
distributed, tamper-resistant, transparent, and peer-to-peer transaction registry, which 
applies cryptography to ensure security trust between untrusted participants (Lemieux 2016; 
Levy 2014; Xu et al. 2017). It became famous for its first instantiation Bitcoin in 2008 
(Nakamoto 2008). In the following years, this instantiation caused a hype around crypto-
currencies, which peaked in 2018.  
The initial instantiation of Bitcoin also stimulated a great variety of use-case applications that 
utilize the characteristics of the underlying technology (Fridgen, Lockl et al. 2018). To date, 
researchers identified many different use-case patterns, such as neutral platforms, forgery-
proof documentation, (payment) transactions, cross-organizational workflows management, 
digital identities, digital documents, ubiquitous digital services (without service provider), and 
economically autonomous machines (Fridgen et al. 2019). Various communities develop and 
propel the idea of blockchain to pursue certain ideological objectives and provide an alternative 
to established centralized systems (Reijers et al. 2016). 
Besides Bitcoin, second generation blockchains are the underlying technology of ICOs, and 
therefore enable the phenomenon. Some of these blockchain technologies come with a built-
in turing-complete programming language and enable smart contracts (Buterin 2014). Smart 
contracts are programs that automatically execute program code under certain conditions, and 
therefore allow parties to securely transact without trust (Beck et al. 2016; Glaser 2017; Sillaber 
and Waltl 2017; Szabo 1997). Further, these second generation blockchains enable the creation 
of usage tokens (Buterin 2014). Usage tokens are digital units of account that can be 
transferred on the blockchain to serve several purposes like currency, or access to platforms 
and services (Glaser and Bezzenberger 2015; Schweizer et al. 2017). With these tokens, a wide 
variety of use-cases emerged, such as crowdfunding, managing digital assets, or implementing 
trust-free asset trade (Nærland et al. 2017).  
The sale of these tokens depicts a novel (crowd) funding mechanism, referred to as ICOs 
(Boreiko and Sahdev 2018; Chanson et al. 2018; Schweizer et al. 2017). Instead of having to 
rely on an investor, ICOs enable participating investors to actually participate in an anonymous 
way in the funding, development, and revenue collection via tokens (Li and Mann 2018). 
Additionally, the successful distribution of the underlying tokens draws a great number of 
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participants toward the issued token, and therefore literally develops an ecosystem. This 
coined the term “ecosystem tokenization via blockchain” (cf., Unibright.io 2018). Recently, 
ICOs became a popular alternative to finance novel and innovative ideas in the organizational 
context (Boreiko and Sahdev 2018; Li and Mann 2018; Schweizer et al. 2017). Organizational 
objectives of such ecosystems include manifold examples: Fishcoin aims to introduce an 
ecosystem for the global seafood industry in order to data-fuel the trade and regulation 
(Fishcoin.io 2018). snowball.money is the first Smart crypto investment automation platform 
that enables everyone to invest like professional investors (snowball.money 2019). Civic 
enables people to take control and protect their identity via an ID platform or reusable know-
your-customer requirements (Civic.com 2019). 
To date, ICOs are a very new phenomenon, and both research and practice only started to 
analyze and evaluate the characteristics and dynamics. However, since many organizations – 
especially start-ups – currently prefer ICOs over traditional financing approaches, a further 
understanding is necessary (Adhami et al. 2018). To this end, ICOs demand complex decisions 
to set-up this multilayered funding approach. For this purpose, it is necessary to analyze design 
parameters of ICOs in more detail, and to find clusters in real-world cases that indicate which 
practices exist. The following Subsection 3.2 provides a methodology on how organizations are 
able to determine the right design parameters for their ecosystem development decisions 
(Bachmann, Drasch, Fridgen et al. 2019; Bachmann, Drasch, Miksch et al. 2019).  
 ANALYSIS OF DESIGN PARAMETERS FOR ICO-BASED ECOSYSTEM 
DEVELOPMENT 
When organizations face difficult decisions, or even lack the understanding of a novel 
phenomenon, it is necessary to derive insights in the first place. For this purpose, following a 
methodological approach in order to find a solution suggests an appropriate interim stage. A 
very suitable approach to analyze characteristics of a novel phenomenon is taxonomy 
development. A taxonomy is a particular classification scheme that is often used to empirically 
or conceptually describe systems of groupings of objects (Nickerson et al. 2013). Therefore, a 
taxonomy provides a set of unifying constructs and a systematic organization of observable 
states (Glass and Vessey 1995). From a research perspective, a taxonomy is “useful in 
discussion, research, and pedagogy” (Miller and Roth 1994, p. 286), in order to organize 
knowledge (Wand et al. 1995), and to increase understanding (Gregor 2006). In the context of 
ICO design parameters, organizations are able to structure observable characteristics. Hence, 
it is possible to organize a previously unknown phenomenon and to gain knowledge in a 
distinct field. Because taxonomies are also easily adaptable, they are suitable for evolving and 
developing fields: Since organizations often struggle to oversee new phenomena at an early 
stage, changes, adaptions, or recreation of the understanding are necessary. The taxonomy 
development approach according to Nickerson et al. (2013) integrates conceptual and 
empirical perspectives into one comprehensive method, which requires seven iterative steps. 
Figure 4 visualizes the taxonomy development method by Nickerson et al. (2013). 
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 Taxonomy development method (own visualization based on Nickerson et 
al. 2013) 
 
After having proposed a first structure (e.g., development of a taxonomy) to an unknown 
phenomenon, there are still hundreds of combinations of dimensions and characteristics. In 
this context, the taxonomy is a first step, but requires further activities. One possible second 
step is the clustering of observable combinations to derive archetypes. In this case, an 
organization is able to link the design of derived archetypes to observable common practices 
and purposes in the field, and potentially conclude recommendations for its own endeavor. 
This step supports the identification of predominant or successful pathways before choosing 
between alternatives. Consequently, organizations search for existing archetypes and their 
characteristics. To address this demand, it is necessary to cluster observable real-world cases 
and derive patterns.  
Pattern recognition is closely related to artificial intelligence, data mining and machine 
learning, and is often used interchangeably with these terms (Bishop 2006). For pattern 
recognition, various algorithms exist, such as classification algorithms, clustering algorithms, 
multilinear and linear regression algorithms, or ensemble learning. Especially when aiming to 
search entities of similar kind, cluster analysis is a statistical technique helping to identify 
respective groups. In general, cluster analysis is applicable to describe generic archetypes of 
entities (Everitt et al. 2011; Hair et al. 2009). According to an analysis of 55 articles in IS 
research, scholars chose this method regularly to classify observations of specific objects 
(Balijepally et al. 2011). For example, when working with previously developed taxonomies, a 
three-step clustering approach is conductible: The first step selects the clustering variables. 
This is a fundamental step, because it directly impacts the resulting clusters (Punj and Stewart 
1983). If the clustering follows a deductive approach, the variables need to be linked closely to 
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extant theory. For this purpose, it is also common to draw on taxonomy dimensions (Haas et 
al. 2014; Ketchen et al. 1993; Ketchen and Shook 1996). The second step selects an appropriate 
clustering algorithm. Here, the selection of hierarchical and non-hierarchical methods is well 
recognized. The third step quantitatively and qualitatively evaluates resulting clusters, and 
thus, analyzes clusters and draws conclusions.  
To provide a structure of ICO design parameters, Fridgen, Regner et al. (2018) develop a 
taxonomy from conceptual and empirical data (Nickerson et al. 2013). Based on their result, 
Bachmann, Drasch, Miksch et al. (2019) and Bachmann, Drasch, Fridgen et al. (2019) further 
refine the taxonomy and derive archetypes (cf., Appendix B.1 and B.2). The development 
process utilizes 84 real-world ICO examples, 6 expert interviews, and the current scientific 
discourse. The resulting taxonomy consists of 23 relevant dimensions encompassing 66 
characteristics resulting from the specific meta-characteristics (Bachmann, Drasch, Fridgen et 
al. 2019; Bachmann, Drasch, Miksch et al. 2019). Table 1 visualizes the final taxonomy. For an 
explanation of the taxonomy’s dimensions and characteristics, please refer to Fridgen, Regner 
et al. (2018) and Bachmann, Drasch, Miksch et al. (2019). 
Table 1. Taxonomy of design characteristics for ICOs (own representation based on 
Bachmann, Drasch, Miksch et al. 2019) 
Dimension Characteristics 
Token implementation level on-chain native sidechain 
Token purpose/type usage work funding staking 
equity 
security 
non- 
equity 
security 
Token supply growth fixed adaptive inflation fixed inflation 
Token supply cap capped uncapped 
Token burning yes no 
Token distribution deferral yes no 
Token holder voting rights yes no 
Issuing legal structure foundation limited 
Team company token share minority majority half 
Team lockup period no single period multiple periods 
Pre-sale before ICO no private public both 
Pre-sale discount yes no 
Planned occurrence multiple rounds single round unspecified 
Registration needed yes no 
Eligibility restrictions none geographic accreditation multiple 
Purchase amount limit none minimum maximum both 
Auction mechanism yes no 
Sales price fixed floating 
Price fixing currency crypto fiat 
Funding currency crypto both none 
Funding cap none hard cap soft cap multiple 
Time horizon block time fixed date open end 
Time-based discount none single rate multiple rates 
 
Based on this taxonomy (cf., Table 1), Bachmann, Drasch, Miksch et al. (2019) and Bachmann, 
Drasch, Fridgen et al. (2019) apply a clustering method according to the explanation earlier in 
this Section to derive ICO archetypes (cf., Appendix B.1 and B.2). Following the three-step 
clustering approach, the study utilizes the underlying real-world cases to identify prevailing 
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patterns. In the context of ICOs, the clustering approach resulted in five archetypes, which 
have high variation between them and low variation within them (Bachmann, Drasch, Fridgen 
et al. 2019; Bachmann, Drasch, Miksch et al. 2019). Table 2 visualizes the resulting archetypes. 
The archetypes are the visionary ICO (1), the liberal ICO (2), the average ICO (3), the compliant 
ICO (4), and the native ICO (5). For an explanation of the archetypes, please refer to 
Bachmann, Drasch, Miksch et al. (2019) and Bachmann, Drasch, Fridgen et al. (2019). 
Table 2. Resulting archetypes of cluster analysis (own representation based on 
Bachmann, Drasch, Fridgen et al. 2019) 
Dimension 
Archetype 
1 2 3 4 5 
Token implementation level On-chain 
(84%) 
On-chain 
(80%) 
On-chain 
(93%) 
On-chain 
(100%) 
Native (86%) 
Token purpose/type Usage (42%) Usage (80%) Usage (59%) Usage (78%) Staking (71%) 
Token supply growth Fixed (84%) Fixed (80%) Fixed (90%) Fixed (89%) fix infl. (71%) 
Token supply cap Capped 
(89%) 
Capped 
(90%) 
Capped (97%) Capped 
(100%) 
uncap. 
(100%) 
Token burning No (58%) No (90%) No (72%) Yes (89%) No (100%) 
Token distribution deferral No (63%) No (70%) Yes (66%) Yes (56%) Yes (86%) 
Token holder voting rights Yes (63%) No (90%) No (90%) No (89%) Yes (71%) 
Issuing legal structure Limited 
(100%) 
Limited 
(75%) 
Limited 
(90%) 
found. (67%) found. (57%) 
Team company token share Minor. 
(100%) 
minor. (75%) minor. (97%) minor. (89%) minor. 
(100%) 
Team lockup period multi. (47%) No (60%) single (59%) multi. (78%) No (57%) 
Pre-sale before ICO No (53%) No (70%) Private (69%) Public (56%) No (71%) 
Pre-sale discount No (79%) No (75%) Yes (100%) Yes (78%) No (71%) 
Planned occurrence single (84%) single (50%) Single (97%) single (89%) single (57%) 
Registration needed Yes (84%) No (85%) Yes (93%) Yes (89%) No (86%) 
Eligibility restrictions geogr. (68%) None (100%) geogr. (55%) None (56%) None (86%) 
Purchase amount limit None (79%) None (80%) None (72%) min. (44%) None (86%) 
Auction mechanism No (100%) No (90%) No (97%) No (100%) No (71%) 
Sales price  Fixed (89%) Fixed (75%) Fixed (86%) Fixed (89%) Fixed (57%) 
Price fixing currency Fiat (68%) Crypto (70%) Crypto (55%) Crypto (78%) Crypto 
(100%) 
Funding currency  Crypto (63%) Crypto (95%) Crypto (83%) Crypto (67%) Crypto 
(100%) 
Funding cap  multi. (74%) hard (45%) hard (66%) multi. (67%) None (71%) 
Time horizon  fixed (95%) fixed (70%) fixed (90%) fixed (89%) fixed (71%) 
Time-based discount No (58%) Multiple 
(55%) 
Multiple 
(52%) 
No (56%) Multiple 
(43%) 
 
An organization that develops an ecosystem using an ICO design can learn from others (e.g., 
first movers) and avoid making identical mistakes. Besides, organizations are also able to 
choose between the outline of different archetypes, and determine the appropriate set of 
decisions. Therefore, taxonomy and archetype development approaches support a 
comprehensive and in-depth understanding, and offer tangible suggestions to decision 
makers. In the context of ICOs, taxonomies and archetypes are two valid IS research artefacts 
to structure a novel and difficult phenomenon. With the resulting archetypes, organizations 
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are able to identify existing and observable ICOs and derive conclusions before starting their 
own ICO.  
As a result, the described approach can help organizations to reflect upon their approach 
aiming to develop novel ecosystems. The success of such ecosystems highly depends on the 
process of starting it. By conducting an ICO and offering a token, this can also be the starting 
point for the underlying platform, which may depict the centerpiece of the ecosystem.  
4. USER INCENTIVES IN PLATFORM-BASED ECOSYSTEM 
DEVELOPMENT USING ICOS 
User incentives for ecosystem participation are among the key aspects of ecosystem 
development. In Section 3, this doctoral thesis already described ICOs as a novel form of 
ecosystem development. Section 4 goes further into detail of user incentives for participation, 
and analyzes the user incentives in the ICO context. 
 INCENTIVES FOR ECOSYSTEM PARTICIPATION  
The development of an ecosystem highly depends on the success of platform adoption. For this, 
all of the previously described participants need an incentive to join a developing ecosystem. 
Only if users as (potential) customers and organizations mingle in the ecosystem, value 
generation for both sides is satisfactorily (direct and indirect network effects). The value of an 
ecosystem to its participants results from the relative contribution of the ecosystem to the goal 
of the participating actors, and therefore directly links to the participation in the network. For 
this purpose, participants often utilize platforms in the ecosystem to exchange products or 
services, or to co-create value. These platforms are called multi-sided platforms, which mediate 
between the participants in several ways (e.g., Amazon, eBay, Uber, Airbnb) (Hagiu and Wright 
2015).  
When developing a new ecosystem, the incentive to join is low for users and other 
organizations. An example refers to the introduction of the telephone network. In the 1850s, 
the telephone landline started operation. Whenever the first person purchased a telephone, the 
utility of having a telephone (e.g., being part of the telephone landline ecosystem) was low. 
There was simply nobody else to call. The second person who joined the telephone landline 
ecosystem had a somehow different perspective: Already one other person had a telephone, so 
at least there was one other person to call. For every other person joining the ecosystem, the 
utility increased. Thus, the incentive for a person to join the telephone platform is higher, when 
there are more users already using the platform (Caillaud and Jullien 2003). This coined the 
term “chicken and egg problem”, when more participants would increase the utility of an 
ecosystem, but participants have no incentive to join the ecosystem due to its low utility. Once 
the platform reaches a critical mass and enough users participate, network effects start to 
accelerate the platform growth (Evans 2014; Katz and Shapiro 1985; Liebowitz and Margolis 
1994; Oren and Smith 1981). Therefore, growth is an important aspect to determine ecosystem 
success. The faster a newly developed ecosystem grows, the faster it proposes value generation 
for organizations and users. 
However, the expected benefit from participating in the ecosystem decides upon joining or not 
joining. In the example of established ecosystems such as Facebook, Instagram, or Twitter, the 
decision is easier. On Facebook nearly 2.5 billion users are active on a monthly basis (as of 
December, 2018, cf., Statista 2019a), on Instagram 1 billion users are active on a monthly basis 
(as of June, 2018, cf., Statista 2019b), and on Twitter, more than 300 million monthly active 
users share news (as of March, 2019, cf., Statista 2019c). Many other organizations observe the 
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high amount of users in these ecosystems and decide to participate as well, offer their products 
and services, and propose additional value. Further, utility for users comes from connecting to 
other users, socially being connected, and exchanging information (about products and 
services, as well as personal things). For other organizations, the utility of joining Facebook, 
Instagram, or Twitter is very high, as the potential users and user networks are obvious.  
 APPLYING ICOS TO INCENTIVIZE ECOSYSTEM PARTICIPATION 
Blockchain is a technology associated to have the necessary potential to change the established 
rules of ecosystem development (Karnjanaprakorn 2017; Lindman et al. 2017; Walter 2017). 
Experts assume that organizations can achieve this by offering utility tokens via an ICO (cf., 
Section 3.1). When organizations decide to develop ecosystems based on ICOs, the offered 
tokens are a means of payment in exchange for a right (of participation, a product, or a service) 
(Swan 2015). In a blockchain-based ecosystem, participants use digital tokens for various 
purposes, e.g., as an internal unit of account, for the verification of block-writing, as a 
facilitation of transactions, or for more creative use-cases such as preventing unintended use 
of the blockchain, or granting token owners access (Conley 2017; Fridgen, Regner et al. 2018; 
Glaser 2017; Schweizer et al. 2017). By issuing such a utility token, early participants can 
benefit from their early adoption: With a growing platform, the utility token is associated with 
increasing value. In the example of the telephone landline ecosystem, this equals an incentive 
to be among the first users, and to benefit from users joining the ecosystem later. As a result, 
ecosystems grow faster, and organizations are able to accelerate the growth. Consequently, it 
is highly relevant to understand blockchain-based platforms and the functionality of the token 
economy in respect to ecosystem development. Therefore, it is necessary to understand the 
promised benefit that incentivizes users to join. Further, it is important to understand the 
implications of this effect on platform adoption.  
To understand these needs, Drasch et al. (2019) apply a two-step approach to evaluate user 
incentives in platform adoption (cf., Appendix B.3). They conduct a qualitative assessment to 
explain the changes in the token value, and to draw conclusions on the platform adoption. The 
results are that the utility token’s inherent combination of payment measure and financial 
incentive does not positively affect each other. After the platform launch, the users’ incentive 
to participate actively on the platform does not hold, but rather incentivizes speculation about 
the financial development. In that case, activity on the platform is low and results in deflation 
of the token value.  
Hence, organizations need to be careful with the users’ incentive in case they want to accelerate 
the growth of the ecosystem using a utility token. This is especially important, as the inherent 
idea contradicts the financial incentive. To avoid making that mistake, it is important that 
organizations consciously weigh their alternatives, and make sure to set out the right 
incentives. As a result, the described approach is suitable to analyze one of many incentives 
that are associated with the development of platform-based ecosystems. Drasch et al. (2019) 
demonstrate the difficulty to evaluate blockchain-related incentives. Although many experts 
predict blockchain to be the solution to many of today’s problem in our ecosystem-centric 
digital world, a careful assessment is necessary.  
5. COOPERATION IN PLATFORM-BASED ECOSYSTEMS: 
DESIGN EVIDENCE FROM BANKS AND FINTECHS  
Cooperation in ecosystems is among the key aspects of organizational objectives to participate 
in platform-based ecosystems (cf., Section 2.3.1). This Section goes into detail of cooperation 
in the organizational context. In some cases, cooperation is a form of reacting to intruders, 
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when alien organizations enter an existing ecosystem and incumbents’ only choice to secure 
their market position is to cooperate with them (e.g., banks and fintechs in the financial service 
industry). Further, this Section provides an analysis approach to structure cooperation 
designs, when affected organizations have to determine the characteristics of cooperation.  
 THE OBJECTIVE OF COOPERATION 
When organizations participate in ecosystems, their aim is to benefit from their participation, 
e.g., by co-creating value with ecosystem users or other organizations (cf., Section 2.2 and 2.3). 
For this purpose, organizations determine the relation to other organizations in the ecosystem. 
Before Facebook became one of the most dominant ecosystems, many different platforms such 
as MySpace and Bebo tried to draw users’ attention and get them to join. However, Facebook 
launched its social media platform in 2004, managed to become the number one platform 
provider, and built one of the largest ecosystems around it. In the ecosystem, Facebook 
encourages and supports other organizations to integrate products, services, and other 
applications, e.g., via application programming interface (Cormode and Krishnamurthy 
2008). Thus, Facebook opens its ecosystem for other organizations, so they can become 
complementors. Within the Facebook ecosystem, Facebook’s complementors are potential 
competitors to each other.  
In contrast to the example of Facebook, organizations are not necessarily interested in having 
organizations within their ecosystems interacting with the users. This is especially relevant in 
cases, where organizations are not as dominant as Facebook. A recent example is the banking 
industry, where the digital transformation also brings fundamental changes for established 
banks (Chishti and Barberis 2016), affecting IT departments, IT strategy, IT business 
processes, and the alignment of the business model (Veit et al. 2014). Subsequently, banks 
need to question their value delivery and customer interaction, all of which are central in 
ecosystems.  
 REACTING TO INTRUDERS IN PLATFORM-BASED ECOSYSTEMS 
In the financial services industry, the digital transformation also enabled financial technology 
start-ups (fintechs) to enter formerly closed ecosystems of banks. Fintechs utilize the 
technological change and create novel technology-enabled value propositions. Many of these 
fintechs converted technology into service-, product-, or process-innovation. In contrast to 
existing incumbents in the financial services industry, fintechs are by far quicker and more 
agile and implement solutions without inconvenient coordination and governance. Thus, 
fintechs currently receive a lot of attention and started to advance into the bank-dominated 
financial service industry (Dapp 2014).  
As a result, many banks are torn back and forth between alternative opinions about fintechs: 
On the one side, fintechs started to take over the low margins in the industry, so banks perceive 
them as competitors. On the other side, fintechs deliver value propositions through innovative 
solutions for existing customers, which makes it difficult to keep them outside the ecosystem. 
As a result, many banks realized the need to understand fintechs as novel organizations within 
their ecosystems. Banks innovation generation and implementation is too slow in comparison 
to fintechs, thus lacks competitiveness in this regard. Consequently, different reactions to 
fintechs are possible. First, banks can setup banking ecosystems and exclude the fintechs from 
the ecosystem (e.g., closed ecosystem). However, this deprives the ecosystem’s users (the 
bank’s customers) from using the fintech innovations. Second, banks can open their 
ecosystems so other banks and fintechs are able to interact with the customers. However, this 
encourages other banks to entice customers, and even lowers the barriers for customer churn. 
Third, a decision can be to acquire the fintech to incorporate the value proposition in the 
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ecosystem. After a while, the integration of the fintechs’ innovation capability would again 
decrease concerning the bank’s slow processes and reactions. Fourth, banks can uphold their 
ecosystems and even strengthen the barriers, but selectively grant access for partners such as 
fintechs or organizations from other domain. Thus, competitors cannot easily poach 
customers, but customers benefit from innovation (Dapp 2014, 2015).  
However, fintechs see no need to restrict their activity to the cooperation with a single partner 
or ecosystem. Currently, many banks demand their innovation capacity and capability at the 
same time. As a result, fintechs started to cooperate with various partners, and mingle in 
different ecosystems, therefore bridging the gap between various banks. However, fintechs are 
not the weak partner in the industry. Consequently, the decision on how to interact with a 
fintech is difficult, because the integration of the fintech’s value proposition from a bank’s 
perspective is in the center. Thus, it is important for banks to understand the characteristics of 
bank-fintech interaction, and deciding on design parameters for the cooperation before 
granting fintechs derogatory access to the ecosystem.  
Yet, research did not address the challenge of determining cooperation, and best practices on 
bank-fintech cooperation are absent. Nevertheless, from an academic and practical 
perspective, the understanding of such cooperation is important. To address this research gap, 
taxonomy development can serve as a suitable methodology. A taxonomy is a particular 
classification scheme that is often used to empirically or conceptually describe systems of 
groupings of objects (Nickerson et al. 2013) (for further details on the taxonomy development 
methodology, please cf., Section 3). Drasch et al. (2018) address the aforementioned challenge 
by developing a theoretically founded and empirically grounded taxonomy to structure 
cooperation between incumbents and start-ups in the financial services industry (cf., Appendix 
B.4). The taxonomy bases on the meta-characteristic of design parameters for bank-fintech 
cooperation in the context of innovation capability enhancement (Drasch et al. 2018). It 
utilizes existing literature, 136 real-world cases, and 12 expert interviews, and results in a 
taxonomy of 13 relevant dimensions encompassing 106 characteristics. Additionally, the 
empirical examination based on the real-world cases allows identifying prevailing cooperation 
patterns. Table 3 visualizes the resulting taxonomy.  
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Table 3. Taxonomy for bank-fintech cooperation to enhance technology innovation (own 
representation based on Bachmann, Drasch, Fridgen et al. 2019) 
 Dimensions Characteristics 
C
o
o
p
e
r
a
ti
o
n
 
Cooperation type Acquisition (7) Alliance (119) Incubation (9) Joint venture (1) 
Innovation type 
Bank-to-customer 
process (22) 
Customer-to-
customer process (16) 
Product (98) 
Maturity of innovation 
Introduction / 
Uncoordinated (28) 
Growth / Segmental 
(105) 
Maturity / Systemic 
(3) 
Value chain location 
Customer 
common 
interface (21) 
Channel 
solutions 
and 
interaction 
platforms 
(21) 
Customer-
oriented 
financial 
market infra-
structure 
(54) 
Core banking 
systems (37) 
Financial 
market infra-
structure 
Business ecosystem 
Restricted by 
bank (24) 
Restricted by 
fintech (90) 
Restricted by 
both (20) 
No restriction  
(2) 
Innovation holder Fintech (125) Bank (11) 
 
B
a
n
k
 
Bank type 
Commercial bank 
(119) 
Cooperative bank (14) Savings bank (3) 
The bank’s main 
distribution channel 
Branches (83) Online (53) 
The bank’s role Services provider (64) 
Services consumer 
(28) 
Investor (44) 
 
The bank’s strategic 
objective  
Market access (57) Technology access (79) 
 
F
in
te
c
h
 Category of fintech 
API and infra-
structure (16) 
Cross-product services 
(20) 
Current account (7) 
Lending (23) Payment (39) Investing (30) Insurance (1) 
The fintech’s maturity Startup (33) Emerging growth (98) Mature stage (5) 
Fintech holding a full 
banking license 
Yes (3) No (133) 
 
The proposed taxonomy enables banks to analyze the complex task of cooperating with 
fintechs, and vice versa. By comparing the target system of a bank to examples from the real-
world cases, the bank is able to determine characteristics on how to design the cooperation. 
Additionally, our findings enhance theory of fintechs, their integration into the banking sector, 
and cross-organizational cooperation. Further, this paper has a practical implication. In the 
context of platform-based ecosystems, the taxonomy is a potential first step to analyze the 
dynamics of cross-organizational cooperation. More generally, the research paper suggests 
dimensions and characteristics that distinguish various bank-fintech cooperation patterns. 
The basic idea remains the integration of the innovation. Yet, since many fintechs have become 
de facto confident market players, banks still need to identify an appropriate pathway to 
integrate the troublemakers, and to adapt their ecosystem accordingly.  
6. MONITORING CUSTOMER INTERACTION IN PLATFORM-
BASED ECOSYSTEM 
User interaction is a key purpose of platform-based ecosystems (cf., Section 2), but inhibits 
certain risks. This Section explains the risks resulting from user interaction and the 
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acceleration role that platform characteristics play in this context. Further, this Section 
proposes a way to monitor such user interaction. 
 RISKS FOR ORGANIZATIONS FROM USER INTERACTION IN 
ECOSYSTEMS  
As described above, organizations participate in ecosystems to create value. One aspect of value 
creation is through user interaction, which in many cases takes place on platforms within the 
ecosystem. As a result, users play a key role in the value creation for organizations in platform-
based ecosystems (Hanna et al. 2011). With the origin of social networks like Facebook and 
Instagram, novel features increasingly enabled the digital co-creation process through user 
interaction in general (e.g., creation of profile pages, user connections, user content) (Cormode 
and Krishnamurthy 2008). Today, social media platforms are predominant in ecosystems for 
communication and interaction between companies and users, as well as among customers 
themselves (Goh et al. 2013; Kietzmann et al. 2011). Prior literature identified different 
categories of such platforms: (Micro-)blogs, online social networks (often also called social 
networking sites), virtual social worlds, collaborative products, content communities, and 
virtual game worlds (Kaplan and Haenlein 2010). Taking their common characteristics into 
account, social media platforms are a “[…] group of internet-based applications that build on 
the ideological and technological foundations of Web 2.0, and that allow the creation and 
exchange of user generated content” (Kaplan and Haenlein 2010, p. 61).  
In the context of ecosystems and the interaction between their participants, online reviews, 
ratings, and critiques of users are the most important source of information for the search of 
products and services (Chen and Xie 2008; Dellarocas 2003; Dellarocas et al. 2007; Moon et 
al. 2010). This so-called electronic word-of-mouth (eWOM) puts platforms into a particularly 
important position in companies’ marketing communications (Albuquerque et al. 2012; Faase 
et al. 2011; Forman et al. 2008). Companies even support the engagement of customer-to-
customer interactions in their platform-based ecosystems (Harris and Dennis 2011; Poynter 
2008). Indeed, prior research emphasized on the positive effects of eWOM for creating 
business value (e.g., Goes 2013; Moe and Trusov 2011; Rishika et al. 2013).  
However, user generated eWOM can also entail risks for organizations. This is the case when 
users generate eWOM to share negative experience related to a specific organization, or to a 
certain product or service. The reasons for negative eWOM are manifold: In some cases, the 
organization or one of its employees made a mistake. In other cases, a misconception in the 
organization-to-user interaction occurred. Maybe, a product disappointed some customer’s 
expectation. All of these reasons happen frequently and do not result from ecosystems, 
platforms, or digital technology. Nevertheless, platforms in ecosystems facilitate the spread of 
negative eWOM to other users, and therefore can directly affect an unforeseeable number of 
other users. The following Subsection puts the spread of eWOM and the characteristics of 
platforms into context. 
 THE ROLE OF PLATFORM CHARACTERISTICS IN THE WORST-CASE 
van Dijck and Poell (2014) theorize on the grounding principles of social media platforms, 
which are programmability, popularity, datafication, and connectivity. Programmability is 
defined as the “ability of a social media platform to trigger and steer users’ creative or 
communicative contribution, while users, through their interaction with these coded 
environments, may in turn influence the flow of communication and information activated by 
such platform” (van Dijck and Poell 2014, p. 5). The platforms algorithms and socio-economic 
components condition popularity. Both can be used to influence or manipulate (van Dijck and 
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Poell 2014). In contrast to the early reputation that social media is more egalitarian, its filtering 
became more sophisticated (van Dijck and Poell 2014). Datafication is the ability to render 
many aspects such as relationships, music, preferences, or GPS-locations into data (Mayer-
Schönberger and Cukier 2014). Datafication enables platforms to know their users, and 
accordingly apply real-time and predictive measures to fine-tune advertising effectiveness (van 
Dijck and Poell 2014). Connectivity is defined as “the socio-technical affordance of networked 
platforms to connect content to user activities and advertisers” (van Dijck and Poell 2014, p. 8). 
Connectivity is distinct from spreadibility, which recognizes the “importance of social 
connections among individuals” (Jenkins et al. 2018, p. 6). However, platforms merely amplify 
the connections between individuals. Connectivity instead allows the forming of fan groups, 
communities, and even alliances. On social media platforms, the underlying network is based 
on these technical features that allow users to build online relationships with many other users 
(e.g., Facebook friends) and communicate intensively among one another (e.g., via wallposts 
and comments in Facebook). As a result, users form dense network clusters (Benevenuto et al. 
2009; Mislove et al. 2007; Wilson et al. 2009). Within these clusters, the information flow is 
usually relatively constant and unrestrained. Consequently, an enormous number of people 
can be reached by eWOM within a short period of time (Pfeffer et al. 2014).  
This also holds for negative eWOM. As a result, platforms accelerate and intensify the exposure 
of users to negative eWOM. Within minutes and hours, a single negative eWOM can reach 
hundreds of thousands of users, which may have the effect of other users tuning in, also sharing 
their negative experiences and therefore contributing to further spread of negative eWOM. In 
many famous examples, organizations such as Coca Cola, DELL, and others experienced such 
events. For very intense forms of such examples, practitioners and researchers coined the term 
“online firestorm”, which can be defined as “[…] the sudden discharge of messages containing 
negative [e]WOM and complaint behavior against a person, company, or group in social media 
networks” (Pfeffer et al. 2014, p. 118). Typically, there is only a very short period of time until 
the next piece of information (Pfeffer et al. 2014), which supports the fast spread of 
information and provides the fuel for online firestorms (Drasch et al. 2015; Lotan 2012). This 
domino effect can lead to a general drop in customer satisfaction, and even affect organizations’ 
share price (Drasch et al. 2015). 
With the risk of thousands of (potential) customers being affected in a very short time, 
organizations need to take timely actions. Otherwise, if the emergence of an online firestorm 
is detected too late, the diffusion of negative eWOM cannot be stopped (Stich et al. 2014). 
Hence, monitoring user interaction and the general sentiment in ecosystems and respective 
platforms is crucial to avoid (in the best case) the actual outburst of an online firestorm. At 
least, organizations need to initiate countermeasures as soon as possible (e.g., by showing 
public regret and apologizing, cf., Munzel et al. 2012). Because of the rapid nature and huge 
volume of eWOM, automated, real-time detection approaches are necessary. 
 MONITORING CUSTOMER INTERACTION FOR RISK MITIGATION 
To enable organizations to monitor customer interaction, Drasch et al. (2015) develop an 
online firestorm detector using design science research that allows organizations the early 
identification of online firestorms (cf., Appendix B.5). The proposed approach enables to 
monitor and detect the raise of positive or negative sentiment by utilizing the characteristics 
of diffusing information and anomaly detection. The detector comprises three steps: In the 
first step, the detector monitors social media channels and collects eWOM. In the second step, 
the detector analyses the collected eWOM according to its sentiment. In the third step, the 
detector conducts anomaly detection, which is inspired by an algorithm from epidemiological 
surveillance (Farrington et al. 1996; Noufaily et al. 2013). Figure 5 visualizes the three-step 
development approach of the online firestorm detector. 
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 Three-step approach of the Online Firestorm Detector (own representation 
based on Drasch et al. 2015) 
 
The resulting artefact allows organizations to monitor user-generated eWOM and to react 
timely to negative eWOM. In ecosystems where organizations crowd users and their customers 
around them, this can be a great advantage to meet the risks of user interaction. As a result, it 
enables organizations to ensure they realize when problems arise. In the context of ecosystems, 
this is very important since the emergence of online firestorms contradicts the efforts of 
organizations.  
7. CONCLUSION 
 SUMMARY 
In today’s digital world, platform-based ecosystems are central for the online interaction 
between organizations and users. Therefore, organizations need to manage ecosystems, and 
position themselves with respect to other participants. The objective of organizations is to 
develop ecosystems that suit their requirements, to incentivize organizations and users to 
participate within them, to cooperate with other participants in order to create value, and to 
monitor the ecosystem to detect negative advancements. This requires novel approaches to 
manage platform-based ecosystems. The doctoral thesis at hand provides an overview of 
platform-based ecosystems and the participants within them, and proposes novel approaches 
inspired by research methods. After providing general insights in Sections 1 and 2, these 
approaches divide the doctoral thesis into five parts.  
The first part discusses the development of novel ecosystems. ICOs introduce new pathways to 
start such development. However, ICOs require multilayered decisions, for which both, 
research and practice, have not yet developed supportive measures. In order to support the 
decision-making, this thesis presents a taxonomy of design parameters for ICOs. Further, the 
taxonomy and real-world cases serve as basis for a clustering algorithm to determine 
predominant ICO archetypes. These archetypes are guidance for other organizations 
considering an ICO. Thus, this work provides insights to the phenomenon of ICOs, and 
suggests a theoretically founded methodology to structure and analyze unknown phenomena.  
The second part focuses on user incentives for ecosystem participation. Ecosystems have the 
particular problem that users have little incentives to join at an early stage, which hampers 
ecosystem development (e.g., telephone landline, chicken and egg problem). ICOs seem to be 
an alternative that provides an additional financial incentive for early ecosystem participation. 
In order to investigate this phenomenon, this doctoral thesis introduces a two-step approach 
and analyzes the financial incentive related to ICOs. The results suggest refraining from the 
presumption of the financial incentive, and propose a different finding. Moreover, it is 
important to carefully weigh and design incentives for platform participation. Thus, this work 
provides insights to the financial incentive and urges practitioners to consider cautiously the 
incentives behind an ICO.  
The third part engages with cooperation between organizations in ecosystems. Inter-
organizational cooperation in ecosystems requires management attention in order to balance 
cooperation and competition at a target-aimed level. Ecosystems require a structured 
Monitoring Social Media 
and Collecting eWOM
Conducting 
Sentiment Analysis
Detecting the Emergence 
of Online Firestorms
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approach on cooperation, especially where new organizations enter and cooperation is 
absolutely necessary and inevitable. For this purpose, this doctoral thesis provides a taxonomy 
to analyze existing forms of cooperation. This taxonomy enables practitioners to structure 
inter-organizational cooperation, before deciding between different alternatives. 
The fourth part discusses the necessity to monitor user interaction in ecosystems. Although 
organizations encourage interaction between ecosystem participants to benefit, the technical 
characteristics of platform-based ecosystems can depict a risky drawback. Unintentional 
mistakes or even misunderstandings can become a boomerang when negative eWOM spreads 
across such ecosystems. As resulting effects can be serious, monitoring and timely 
identification of raising online firestorms are necessary. For this purpose, this doctoral thesis 
proposes an online firestorm detector to monitor user generated eWOM. The detector enables 
organizations to monitor interaction effectively within ecosystems, and enriches existing 
research on the dark side of eWOM and its diffusion. 
In summary, this thesis provides guidance on the development of approaches to manage 
platform-based ecosystems, and on how organizations are able to utilize these approaches. The 
thesis contributes to the scientific discourse by building upon existing research and designing 
new artefacts, which address previously identified, relevant research gaps in today’s society. 
Moreover, this work supports practitioners by providing novel approaches to manage 
platform-based ecosystems. 
 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
The research articles underlying this doctoral thesis are subject to limitations. This subsection 
does not reiterate the individual limitations of each artefact, but provides an aggregated 
overview of the thesis’ limitations, and gives an outlook on further research towards platform-
based ecosystems.  
This thesis addresses engineering oriented aspects of IS research. In this context, it develops 
artefacts, e.g., by applying design science research, or taxonomy development. These artefacts 
deal with specific challenges that arise from participating in ecosystems, namely the 
development of ecosystems, incentives for participating in ecosystems, cooperating in 
ecosystems, and monitoring of ecosystems. The development of the artefacts follows a certain 
practically relevant problem, and focuses on its solution. Further, the evaluation of the 
artefacts takes place in the narrow problem context and bases on the respective data. As a 
result, the solution is not necessarily applicable in other or general contexts. Yet, an artefact is 
the first important step towards the development of higher order theory, where the artefact’s 
full potential can be utilized. Therefore, further empirical investigations, theoretical modelling 
and real-world experiments to validate the results are necessary. 
In addition, the addressed approaches to manage ecosystems require a holistic discussion and 
an interdisciplinary perspective from various research disciplines. This thesis captures an IS 
perspective and applies methods and knowledge in this regard. Thus, it makes a first step by 
proposing the aforementioned approaches. To further understand and fully analyze 
ecosystems and their platform-based nature, there is a fundamental need for a 
transdisciplinary dialog with the involvement of researchers, practitioners, and politicians. 
The objective for future development of ecosystems is manifold: First, further market 
penetration of artificial intelligence, blockchain, and internet-of-things will certainly influence 
“daily life” in platform-based ecosystems. Examples are the interaction with artificially 
intelligent participants in ecosystems, the discussion on blockchain-enabled neutral platforms, 
or the results from interconnected things on ecosystems. Research needs to address the 
opportunities, challenges, and changes that these changes bring to platform-based ecosystems. 
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Second, research on ecosystem development and design objectives is scarce. Nevertheless, this 
question is among the central ones when starting to develop an ecosystem. Third, research 
addressing competition within ecosystems has not yet reached its full potential. However, 
many organizations consider entering into competing ecosystems for the sake of growing their 
market share. When alien organizations enter an ecosystem, organizations need to take 
countermeasures. However, the identification of such countermeasures from a researcher’s 
perspective is absent.  
By developing and proposing novel approaches to manage ecosystems, future research should 
focus on practically relevant problems, and transfer research methods to enable solution 
development. In the context of the development of novel ecosystems, research should build on 
the taxonomy and archetypes derived in Drasch et al. (2018). More insights about implications 
from design decisions in ecosystem development are necessary, as well as further knowledge 
on predominant patterns. For example, an in-depth analysis of ecosystem characteristics with 
respect to the chosen archetype or a long-term analysis on success factors within such 
ecosystems would greatly benefit future knowledge development. In the context of ecosystem 
participation and its incentives, more analysis is necessary on how to solve the chicken and egg 
problem. Since ICOs are supposed to be a promising approach, the results of Drasch et al. 
(2019) can serve as a suitable starting point. In the context of ecosystem cooperation between 
organizations, the taxonomy of Drasch et al. (2018), proposes a first structure for the case 
between banks and fintechs. The taxonomy opens a variety of research opportunities, such as 
specific case studies, or empirical performance analysis. In the context of ecosystem 
monitoring, Drasch et al. (2015) consider the dark side of ecosystems, e.g., the risk from 
negative eWOM. Here, further analysis of countermeasures, timely reaction, and specific case 
studies is necessary to understand how to react in these events.  
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successful research streams relating to ecosystems and IT portfolio management, and 
contributing to relatively new streams of future work such as blockchain research. 
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Appendix A. DECLARATION OF CO-AUTHORSHIP AND 
INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTION 
This doctoral thesis bases on five research papers. Three of them are published in scientific 
journals or scientific conference proceedings. Two of the five research papers belong together, 
as one is an extension of the other (research paper 1 is an extension of research paper 2). The 
research papers were developed by different research teams, which integrated the perspectives 
of researchers with different experiences and, where possible and appropriate, from different 
disciplines. This heterogeneous (transdisciplinary) collaboration allows this thesis to 
contribute to the scientific discourse and to support organizations in managing their 
ecosystems. To assess my contribution to the research projects, I describe the respective 
settings in the following: 
The first research paper Bachmann, Drasch, Fridgen et al. (2019) “Tarzan and Chain: 
Exploring the ICO Jungle and Evaluation Design Archetypes” is an extension of the second 
research paper Bachmann, Drasch, Miksch et al. (2019), which bases on the first consideration 
of Fridgen, Regner et al. (2018). The research team consisted of seven researchers who 
contributed in the course of the research process. In the project, I had the role of an 
experienced researcher, and provided feedback and guidance in the entire course of the project. 
My contribution was to the taxonomy revision, cluster analysis, and token performance 
analysis. I evaluated the taxonomy, the cluster analysis, and the token performance analysis, 
and carried out the textual elaboration. For the second research paper, I presented our work at 
the International Conference on Wirtschaftsinformatik in Siegen, Germany. Thus, my co-
authorship is reflected in the entire research project, with a focus on the cluster and token 
performance analysis. 
In the third research project Drasch et al. (2019) “The token’s secret: The two-faced financial 
incentive of the token economy”, the research team consisted of five researchers. One of them 
(Prof. Fridgen) is very experienced. In this project, I had the role of an experienced researcher, 
providing feedback, and guiding the research process. In particular, I contributed to the 
refinement of the premise of the paper, the development of a specific research objective, the 
conceptualization of the structure of the paper, the development of the evaluation, the 
interpretation of the results, and the textual elaboration. Thus, my co-authorship is reflected 
in the entire research project, especially subsequent to the first submission.  
In the fourth research paper Drasch et al. (2018) “Integrating the ‘Troublemakers’: A 
Taxonomy for Cooperation between Banks and Fintechs”, the research team consisted of three 
researchers. One of them (Prof. Urbach) is very experienced and mainly provided feedback on 
the research process. My contribution was to the initiation, development, and elaboration 
during the entire research project. I contributed to the literature analysis, to the development 
of the taxonomy, to the evaluation of the taxonomy, to the cluster analysis, and to the textual 
elaboration. Thus, my co-authorship is reflected in the entire research project. 
In the fifth research project Drasch et al. (2015) “Detecting online firestorms in social media”, 
the research team consisted of four researchers. One of them was very experienced. This paper 
resulted from one of my first research projects. Under the supervision of two of the co-authors 
and jointly with the third co-author, I contributed to the development of the idea, the 
motivation, the research process, the model, and the evaluation. Together with one of my co-
authors, I contributed to the generation and interpretation of the results, which we then 
prepared for the paper. The formulation of the paper was mainly driven by three of the four 
co-authors (including myself). After acceptance for the International Conference on 
Information Systems 2015, I presented our research in Forth Worth, Texas, USA. The fourth 
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most experienced co-author contributed by his valuable feedback and experience to the 
formulation process. Thus, my co-authorship is reflected in the entire research project.  
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Appendix B. UNDERLYING RESEARCH PAPERS OF THIS 
DOCTORAL THESIS 
B.1. TARZAN AND CHAIN: EXPLORING THE ICO JUNGLE AND 
EVALUATION DESIGN ARCHETYPES 2 
Authors: Nina Bachmann, Benedict J. Drasch, Gilbert Fridgen, 
Michael Miksch, Ferdinand Regner, André Schweizer, Nils 
Urbach 
Citation: Bachmann, N.; Drasch, B. J.; Fridgen, G.; Miksch, M.; 
Regner, F.; Schweizer, A.; Urbach, N. (2019): Tarzan and 
Chain: Exploring the ICO Jungle and Evaluating Design 
Archetypes. Working paper. 
Keywords: Blockchain, ICO, taxonomy, archetypes, success analysis 
Ranking of outlet: Under revision 
 
Extended Abstract 
Initial coin offerings (ICO) are drawing increasing attention as a novel funding mechanism. 
ICO is a form of crowdfunding that utilizes blockchain-based tokens to allow for truly peer-to-
peer investments. In 2018, globally raised funding was at about $12bn via ICOs. Although 
research provided a first structure in the form of taxonomies (Fridgen, Regner et al. 2018) and 
developed artefacts to cluster predominant characteristics (Bachmann, Drasch, Miksch et al. 
2019), an outlook on the development of such ICOs on the secondary market is absent. Similar 
to investments in cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin and Ethereum so far, it is impossible for issuers 
and investors to oversee long-term development, benefit, and risks. However, ICOs are only a 
recent phenomenon, as the start of ICOs was less than five years ago and observable use cases 
and time periods are small. Regulators and many governmental institutions have just started 
to take action in the so far mostly unregulated ICO market. To date, research lacks behind in 
providing a comprehensive and in-depth analyses of ICO designs and their chances of success.  
We address this research gap by extending the work of Fridgen, Regner et al. (2018) and 
Bachmann, Drasch, Miksch et al. (2019) and following a three-phase approach. First, we 
develop a taxonomy of empirically validated ICO design parameters. We apply the established 
                                                        
 
2 This essay was co-authored with Nina Bachmann, Gilbert Fridgen, Michael Miksch, Ferdinand 
Regner, André Schweizer, and Nils Urbach. At the time of the publication of this thesis, this essay is in 
the review process of a scientific journal. Thus, I provide an extended abstract that covers the essay’s 
content. Earlier versions of this essay have been published in the Proceedings of the 26th European 
Conference on Information Systems (ECIS 2018) and in the Proceedings of the 14th Internationale 
Tagung Wirtschaftsinformatik (WI 2019):  
Fridgen, Gilbert; Regner, Ferdinand; Schweizer, André; Urbach, Nils (2018): Don't Slip on 
the Initial Coin Offering (ICO) - A Taxonomy for a Blockchain-enabled Form of Crowdfunding. 
In: Proceedings of the 26th European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS2018). 
Portsmouth, UK.  
Bachmann, Nina; Drasch, Benedict; Miksch, Michael; Schweizer, André (2019): Dividing the 
ICO Jungle: Extracting and Evaluating Design Archetypes. In: Proceedings of the 14th 
Internationale Tagung Wirtschaftsinformatik (WI 2019). Siegen, Germany.  
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and well-recognized taxonomy development method proposed by Nickerson et al. (2013). 
Second, we build upon our taxonomy and empirically investigate ICO archetypes to obtain an 
in-depth understanding of prevailing dimensions and characteristics. As a result, we identify 
five ICO archetypes, which illustrate different combinations and dominant aspects within the 
ICO design parameters. Third, we conduct an analysis of the secondary market development 
of 84 real-world ICO cases. Doing so, we follow the research approach of Smith + Crown 
(2017). For this purpose, we consider the performance of underlying tokens on the secondary 
market in order to obtain how both, single cases and aggregated archetypes, develop. We link 
the indications of the secondary market development to the characteristics of our archetypes, 
and describe what we observe in detail. To increase the expressiveness of our results and to 
account for overall market trends, we compare archetypes to the overall token market 
performance in the short, medium, and long term. We observe differing developments among 
the identified ICO archetypes.  
Our research allows deriving three key findings: First, our taxonomy provides a structure for 
ICOs. Second, our cluster analysis results in archetypes that summarize ICOs of similar kind. 
Third, our analysis of secondary market performance provides an outlook on indicative ICO 
development. We thereby contribute to theory building in the fields of ICOs and provide 
practitioners with various backgrounds and perspectives on the phenomenon. First, our 
taxonomy and clustering approach provide a systematic and comprehensive overview of 
predominant ICO design parameters and ICO archetypes. These artefacts allow structuring the 
complex domain in a comprehensible way. Second, the archetypes extend existing 
classifications of ICOs by various aspects and allow for generalizable findings, instead of taking 
into account single characteristics. Especially, our findings provide a structured guidance for 
ventures that plan to conduct an ICO. Third, for traditional financial intermediaries including 
early stage venture capitalists or crowdfunding platforms, the taxonomy and archetypes may 
help to characterize potential competitors. Fourth, our findings of the short- and long-term 
ICO archetype performance analysis are of vital importance for research on ICOs and 
blockchain governance issues, since they allow deriving the impact of different governance 
configurations.   
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Extended Abstract: 
The sale of blockchain-based digital tokens as a novel funding mechanism, referred to as initial 
coin offerings (ICO), has grown exponentially, resulting in $12bn raised globally during the 
first half of 2018. However, the concept and its implications are unclear to investors, founders, 
and academia. In particular, a systematic understanding of what exactly constitutes an ICO is 
missing but required to establish a common knowledge base and enable a widespread use as a 
commodity service. To date, the young phenomenon is still very heterogeneous, and 
approaches of standardization are in their infancy. Existing research provides first insights into 
ICO endeavors and design. However, comprehensive and in-depth analyses of ICO design 
archetypes and prevailing ICO characteristics are missing.  
We address this research gap by extending the work of Fridgen, Regner et al. (2018) and 
following a two-step approach: First, we extend and enrich the existing ICO taxonomy by 
following the well-recognized taxonomy development method proposed by Nickerson et al. 
(2013). Taxonomies as frameworks are well suited to lay the groundwork for emergent fields 
of research and serve as the first step into systematizing the emerging research domain 
(Williams et al. 2017). By collecting a data-sample of 84 real-world ICOs with detailed 
information, we are able to account for recent changes in the ICO market and resulting 
incompleteness in the initial taxonomy. Second, we apply a two-stage cluster analysis to 
identify predominant ICO archetypes, with Pearson 𝜒2, Carmer's V and pairwise post-hoc tests 
to validate the significance of the clusters (Aldenderfer and Blashfield 1984; Hair et al. 1998; 
Ketchen and Shook 1996). Cluster analysis serves as an approach to abstract from individual 
cases, in order to derive insights that are more general. As a result, we obtain a taxonomy with 
23 dimensions and 66 characteristics. The cluster analysis suggests five ICO archetypes, which 
illustrate different combinations and dominant aspects within the ICO design parameters: the 
average ICO, the liberal ICO, the visionary ICO, the compliant ICO, and the native ICO. We 
continue by describing the ICO archetypes in detail, and formulate predominant 
characteristics of the archetypes.  
We thereby contribute to a comprehensive and in-depth understanding of the ICO 
phenomenon and its implications. Further, we offer practitioners tangible design suggestions 
for future ICOs. First, we provide a systematic and comprehensive overview of predominant 
ICO design parameters and ICO archetypes. These artefacts allow structuring the complex 
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domain in a comprehensible way. Second, the archetypes extend existing classifications of 
ICOs by various aspects and allow for generalizable findings, instead of taking into account 
single characteristics. Especially, our findings provide a structured guidance for ventures that 
plan to conduct an ICO. 
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Extended Abstract: 
Multi-sided platforms such as Amazon, Uber or Airbnb are omnipresent in today’s digital 
world. As of 2016, four of the top 5 organizations used platform-based business models. 
However, developing a platform is difficult, as potential platform participants expect low 
platform utility and lack the incentive to join at an early stage. A visualization depicts the 
introduction of the telephone network in the 1850s: The utility from having a phone was lowest 
for the first person who purchased a telephone. For every next person joining the network, the 
utility increased. Once the platform reaches a critical mass of users, network effects take effect 
and accelerate platform growth. This challenge in platform development coined the term 
“chicken and egg” problem. Blockchain-enabled utility tokens hold the promise to overcome 
this problem: They supposedly provide a suitable financial incentive for their owners to join 
the platform as soon as possible. Although we know little about this financial incentive, 
investors seemed to believe in the presumption and spent enormous sums in token sales in the 
past years. Especially blog articles and online communities suggest blockchain-based tokens 
to be the answer to the chicken and egg problem. To date, this financial incentive remains an 
assumption, since an in-depth analysis is absent.  
We analyze this financial incentive by proposing a two-step approach to develop a model for 
token valuation. We model user incentives in a two-sided blockchain-based platform where 
sellers and buyers interact. We divide the model into two distinct phases: Phase 1 is before the 
platform launch, when the platform is still in the development phase. For this phase, we apply 
a qualitative assessment of the financial incentive. Phase 2 is after the launch, when sellers and 
buyers started trading. For this phase, we apply a monetary approach to model the token value. 
In a first step, we consider each phase individually. In a second step, we consider both phases 
integrated.  
Our results suggest that blockchain-based utility tokens do not incorporate a financial 
incentive for token owners, and consequently tokens are not a solution for the chicken and egg 
problem. Phase 1 holds a financial incentive if enough platform participants believe in a 
positive fulfilling, which is rather a self-fulfilling prophecy. This leads to a decrease in platform 
activity in Phase 2, which results in a deflationary character of the token’s value development. 
                                                        
 
3 This essay was co-authored with Gilbert Fridgen, Tobias Manner-Romberg, Fenja Nolting, and Sven 
Radszuwill. At the time of the publication of this thesis, this essay is in the review process of a scientific 
journal. Thus, I provide an extended abstract that covers the essay’s content.  
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However, these tokens lead to contradictory incentives for platform participants, and can even 
inhibit platform adoption. 
Our contribution is twofold: First, for the academic audience, our findings suggest that the 
incorporation of user incentives in the context of blockchain-based platform development 
using tokens is necessary. For this purpose, our results serve as an initial step, as the research 
paper is the first to analyze the financial incentive of utility tokens. Thus, we start the creation 
of a deeper understanding. As our findings propose, the financial incentive is two-faced, and 
urgently needs further analysis for a deeper understanding. Second, our findings suggest that 
a careful application of token-based platform development is necessary. We encourage 
practitioners to revise token design to ensure a sustainable economic cycle on the platform. 
Especially, to enable long-term success and to avoid “pump and dump” behavior, token 
application demands for the consideration of theoretical knowledge.  
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Extended Abstract: 
The banking sector has been subject to fundamental changes from the digital transformation. 
New technologies enable new banking applications and services and require appropriate and 
aligned countermeasures. As digitalization progresses, it enables novel technology-driven 
banking services and creates new customer demands. While banks face sluggish innovation 
processes, financial technology startup companies (fintechs) create new technology-enabled 
opportunities to fulfill emerging customer-demanded needs or even create novel customer 
needs. Consequently, banks need to react to the new contenders in the industry. Although 
banks have realized that cooperation with fintechs is a key approach to foster innovation, they 
struggle to address the associated challenges. Yet, there has been little research on this 
phenomenon (e.g., to establish best practices), because neither bank-fintech cooperation, nor 
associated and relevant characteristics have been evaluated. However, especially from an 
economic and financial perspective it is crucial to close this research gap to understand better 
the design parameters of bank-fintech cooperation. Further, it is necessary to understand how 
technology-driven organizations and cooperating with them reshapes the financial sector and 
therefore entire economies.  
We address this research gap by proposing a theoretically founded and empirically proven 
taxonomy. Taxonomies as frameworks are well suited to lay the groundwork for emergent 
fields of research and serve as the first step into systematizing the emerging research domain 
(Williams et al. 2017). For the development, we apply the well-recognized taxonomy method 
proposed by Nickerson et al. (2013). By collecting a data-sample of 136 real-world bank-fintech 
cooperation cases, based on related literature, and 12 expert interviews, we obtain a taxonomy 
structuring and describing bank-fintech cooperation through 13 dimensions and 106 
characteristics. Further, the empirical examination allows for the identification of prevailing 
cooperation patterns. 1) Invest in fintechs to form an alliance and access the fintech’s 
ecosystem. 2) Acquire and integrate channel solutions and interaction platform innovation. 3) 
Innovate lending core banking systems to optimize bank-to-customer processes. 4) Access 
investment markets by providing banking services to fintechs. 5) Cross-product services to 
innovate bank-to-customer processes in bank ecosystems. 6) Early-stage cooperation for 
technology access.  
Our research contributes to theory and practice. We lay the foundation for further research 
into fintechs and their integration into the banking sector, and suggest design parameters that 
are important for consideration in bank-fintech cooperation. The taxonomy’s 
multidimensionality lays the foundations for analyzing interdependencies among the 
dimensions and characteristics – a future research area we find promising. Our taxonomy 
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depicts a crucial step towards a deeper understanding of the field, and can serve as a starting 
point for other economies and industries, where similar phenomena arise. For practitioners, 
we propose a classification scheme to evaluate efforts at the interaction between banks and 
fintechs. Practitioners who apply our taxonomy can analyze their own endeavors in integrating 
fintechs and their innovation, and can evaluate their value proposition within such 
cooperation. We also find that both parties benefit from the model, and complement each 
other’s strengths and weaknesses. 
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Extended Abstract: 
For organizations, customer interaction in today’s world shifted toward social media. Here, 
customers search for information about products and services, and utilize publicly available 
reviews, ratings, and critiques of fellow consumers. Social media has also changed the way 
information diffuses, thus increasing the reach and speed of electronic word-of-mouth 
(eWOM). As a result, it has intensified customers’ exposure to negative eWOM as well, and 
organizations increasingly suffer from massive outbursts of negative eWOM, known as online 
firestorms. Because of their dynamics, it is nearly impossible to stop online firestorms if their 
emergence is not detected promptly. However, well-founded approaches that provide 
automated, real-time detection are missing.  
We address this research gap by designing an Online Firestorm Detector based on design 
science research (Hevner et al. 2004). Our artefact comprises of three major steps: First, we 
monitor social media and collect eWOM. Second, we conduct a sentiment analysis to analyze 
the overall sentiment of publicly expressed opinions. Third, we propose an algorithm inspired 
by epidemiological surveillance systems. For the evaluation of our artefact, we use real-world 
data from a firestorm suffered by Coca Cola, and prove the utility and validity of the proposed 
approach. With our firestorm detector and the Coca Cola data sample, we can be reliably detect 
the outburst of the online firestorm shortly after the first piece of related negative eWOM has 
been generated. Further, the number of false alarms generated by our Online Firestorm 
Detector is low. A comparison with competing artefacts indicates that the Online Firestorm 
Detector is superior to approaches that could be alternatively used. 
Our research contributes to theory and practice. We enrich existing IS and marketing literature 
on the analysis of eWOM in social media to avert its potential dark side, as existing literature 
mainly focuses on the positive aspects. Especially, the question of when to trigger an alarm if 
negative eWOM spreads over an entire network needed an answer. Hence, the design of our 
Online Firestorm Detector constitutes an essential element in averting the potential negative 
consequences of companies’ social media engagements. We contribute to a valid theoretical 
basis for research on eWOM diffusion in social media. The successful empirical demonstration 
and evaluation of our artefact indicates that research regarding the early detection of outbreaks 
of infectious diseases is transferrable to the context of social media. Further, we extend the 
understanding of online firestorms by showing that not only negative eWOM is necessary in 
the detection. Our empirical demonstration and evaluation indicates that considering both 
negative and total eWOM leads to significantly less false alarms. For practitioners, we propose 
a useful artefact that serves as an automated detector. In fact, our results suggest that common 
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lightweight solutions are unable to detect reliably online firestorms in social media. 
Consequently, lightweight solutions demand resources to verify alarms. 
 
